McGill Policy Association

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Political, Institutional, and Psychological Centralization: A Critique of Canada's Electoral System and Parliamentary Representation (Part 1)

Part 1: Powerless Representation

In this series, I seek to examine and criticize the nature of the representation produced under the first-past-the-post electoral system. Incredible changes in our society have occurred since the adoption of the system in 1867, and this has been paralleled by sweeping changes in the role of the MP in parliament, away from that which was originally intended. While all progress is change, not all change is progress, and it is my belief that these changes have been to the detriment of the effectiveness of representative democracy in this country. While this article is by no means exhaustive, I seek to demonstrate here that there is a palpable connection between the first-past-the-post electoral system (FPP), the party system, and high party centralization in Canada, which manifests itself in governments dominated by large brokerage parties with power concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister (PM), maintained through strict party discipline. These are changes that have been reinforced and maintained by a voting mentality in the general population that largely excludes the individual MP from consideration in favour of the party and party leader, and I propose this could be mitigated by the adoption of a new electoral system, which would reconsolidate the position of MPs to act in their intended capacity to hold the government accountable, act as a check on the power of the PM, and vote in accordance with their own judgement, not that of the PM and the party whip.

An important consideration in the examination of this topic is that Canadian political institutions were designed to exist within a larger system of checks and balances, which has largely eroded over time. Parliament, the principal institution of political power in this country, was meant to operate in such a way that the power wielded by the prime minister could be balanced by either government or opposition MPs. Under the principle of responsible government, that is the idea of a government accountable to the elected members of the house of commons, MPs were meant to hold the government accountable, regardless of whether or not it was their own party that formed the government. This is no longer the case. While under FPP it is the MPs who are directly elected to parliament, and one would expect this gives them a mandate to represent the interests primarily of their constituency, MPs today are overwhelmingly expected to prioritize the interests of the party, which are leader dominated, over those of their constituency. This is true to such an extent that the MPs of the major parties are provided daily with voting agendas with instructions on how to vote for the days’ legislation, which is dictated by the orders of the PM and not the desires of the relevant MPs constituents. In practice, the vast majority of MPs do not oppose any legislation supported by their party leader on grounds of any kind, and those that do are not part of the party for long. 

 For example, in 2007 conservative MP Bill Casey voted against the government's annual budget citing concerns it broke a federal resource agreement with Newfoundland and Labrador, and was swiftly expelled from the party caucus. When the Conservative riding association renominated him to run as the conservative candidate in the 2008 election the party head office vetoed his candidacy as suspended the board of the association. The reverse is true for most of the parties representing the opposition, as in a majority government scenario opposition parties typically vote as a bloc against any legislation their leader opposes. Thus, while intended to operate primarily as individual actors, MPs today largely operate in parliament at the direction of their party leader, as team players. 

The individual power held by MPs has degraded so greatly that many scholars have questioned their power even as a  collective body. The Prime Minister not only has the traditional powers of complete discretion over ministerial and committee appointments for MPs, but they over time also acquired the power to revoke electoral candidacy or expel MPs from their caucuses at will. This degree of power stems from their position as both party leader and head of government, two positions which have steadily grown in importance since the time of confederation, and works to ensure that individual MPs are heavily reliant on their party leader for both career advancement and job security. As the distinguished Canadian political scientist Donald Savoie wrote, the levels of influence  available to the Canadian Prime Minister, “constitute a veritable juggernaut of power.” Nearly every piece of government legislation, on which the Prime Minister has the final word, is essentially treated as a confidence vote, and MPs are required to vote accordingly. This is not something that can be understated. Party discipline, the level to which MPs are expected to vote in accordance with their party, is higher in Canada than it is in any comparable system in the world. Questions asked by MPs during question period, what they are allowed to say in debate, and what questions they ask important witnesses while in committee, are pre-prepared for them in the form of literal scripts by the party leadership. “Literacy skills have replaced debating skills in what passes as a debate in the House of Commons,” writes Brent Rathgeber, a former MP. As such, questions posed by MPs of the government party towards the government during question period are not really questions as much as they are verbal felatio in promotion of the governments current policies. While MPs do have the power to introduce private member bills, these votes are typically whipped by party leadership as well, if the leadership allows them at all. This aspect of government is best described by political scientist John Stewart 

“The remorseless slaughter of private members’ motions and public bills reveals the modern constitution. It is the ministers, not the private members, who are held responsible for the governing of the country.”

The culmination of these aspects of governance means that when a majority government is elected in Canada, which is typically the case, the Prime Minister wields nearly the entire power vested in parliament. The opposition, able to do little more than delay the legislation and attempt to sway public support, is reduced to a toothless beast. As stated by British scholars Stuart Weir and David Beetham:

“In practice, a single-party government, backed by a parliamentary majority, can legislate as it wishes on whatever it wishes and can evade parliamentary criticism almost without compunction.”

This quote is unfortunately a particularly accurate characterization of the sad state of affairs that has become our parliament. When the act of winning a majority government dictates to all a virtual guarantee that no legislation proposed by the Prime Minister will fail to pass for the next four years, the government in Canada is not so much a democracy as an elected dictatorship that seeks approval or could be replaced at scheduled intervals. It is simply not in the democratic interest of Canadians for parliament to be composed of party leaders, their cabinets, and trained seals. MPs, even backbenchers, have a significant role to play in keeping a healthy representative democracy’s government accountable.