Part 2: A Failure of Internal Logic

Now one may ask if problems exist in parliament, why not simply reform parliament? Why even consider reforming the electoral system? As I hope to illustrate in this section, while debate surrounding electoral reform usually focuses on how it should allocate seats in parliament more in accordance to the most recent distribution of the popular vote, the electoral system also plays a significant role in the centralization of power away from the MP. By outlining the rules of the game political actors must play to achieve and maintain political power, it provides a framework for how citizens are expected to participate within the democracy, to perceive political actors, and what to consider when casting their ballot. It would thus be a mistake when analyzing electoral reform to limit considerations exclusively to the discrepancy between the popular vote and the resulting makeup of parliament. There is indeed a link between the maintenance of party centralization and the structure of the electoral system. In many ways, the dynamic of party discipline is reinforced, if not dependent, on the electoral system.  

So what is first-past-the-post (FPP)? FPP, also known as single-member plurality, is a system whereby each seat in Parliament has a corresponding electoral district, which must be won by the candidate in order to take their seat as an MP. In order to win a district, a candidate must achieve a plurality of the vote, or in other words, must simply win the most votes regardless of what proportion of the vote that represents. Due to this requirement, a modest base of support in any one constituency is fruitless if it does not constitute a plurality. Votes cast for any candidate other than he or she who is victorious are ‘wasted’, as they carry no influence on the electoral process once a winner has been selected. 

Due to this dynamic, small party candidates and independent candidates operate at a major disadvantage, as not only must they face the usual challenges associated with competing against well-established, better funded, and more media-salient adversaries, but they have to out-perform every single one in at least one riding in order to gain access to parliament. The term media-salient, in this case, refers both to direct media coverage and in terms of increased advertising resources. While proponents argue that this effectively maintains a party system that limits radical parties, this effect is nonspecific and applies to small parties, new parties, and independent candidates, regardless of their political position. As a result of the barriers to entry and the costs of losses being so high, not only are MPs heavily reliant on party support in order to be elected and reelected, but the parties they rely on run a virtual electoral oligopoly. This reality leaves MPs in parliament with few feasible alternatives to abiding by the strict rules concerning party discipline. 

This reality is incongruent with how the political system was designed and how FPP was intended to function. The entire premise of a democracy utilizing FPP is that MPs are meant to be accountable primarily to the constituents of the riding they are intended to represent. In theory, there should be a reasonably strong connection between constituents and their respective MP, which would not only allow citizens to hold their representatives accountable but also would counterbalance the power that the party has over the representative. The major problem with FPP in this country is that this is simply not the case. The traits of a particular candidate running in any given riding are almost certainly not serious considerations for the average voter, and this has been continuously demonstrated over the past 60 years.

 A study by Clarke et al, in an analysis on the 1974 election, determined that the amount of variation in vote choice explained by the local candidate was zero percent for durable partisan voters, and three percent among flexible partisans, or those who tend to lean towards a certain party but have voted for other parties. Another study by William Irvine on the 1982 election demonstrated that most voters were unable to evaluate their local candidate, and those that did typically did so based on partisanship, not based on actual actions by the candidate or constituency service. A study by Andre Blais on the 2000 election showed that the local candidate was a decisive factor in the vote of just 5% of the electorate. In a follow-up study using data from the 2015 election, Blais found that of those who could name a preferred local candidate, 81% indicated it was the local candidate for their preferred party. In general, it seems to be the case that if people know the names of their local candidates it is not because of what they know about the candidate, but because of the party affiliation. However, of those that indicated a preference for a candidate who was not representing their preferred candidate, 40% would actually vote for the candidate and not the party. While significant, this represents 3.6% of the total electorate. The results of these last two studies largely confirm what political scientists in Canada have known for decades: that Canadians overwhelmingly vote based on party, followed closely by the party leader. 

On several levels, this is unsurprising. Firstly, if the average voter knows essentially nothing about the candidates running in their riding, they can hardly be expected to make political decisions based on them. A study conducted in 2013, when MPs would have been in parliament for a minimum of two years following the federal election in 2011, demonstrated that a mere 36% of Canadians could so much as name their MP. Yet it should be noted that in the Blais studies, it was demonstrated that approximately 40-50% of the survey’s respondents could name a preferred candidate during an election. While the ability of Canadians to identify further details about their MPs  remains largely unexplored, the existing literature suggests that many individuals would not only fail to identify their MP, but would also be unable to list the political beliefs that distinguish them within their own party. Even during an election, the amount of Canadians who could do this for more than one local candidate is likely an extremely small proportion of the population. 

The information that Canadians do retain is primarily about leaders, parties, and issues. This is because modern psychology posits that the world is seen by individuals through a set of psychological heuristics, labelled as schemas. Schemas are essentially simplified understandings of a concept used by the individual to more easily navigate the world, but they do not necessarily represent a flawless reflection of external reality. Information is processed, patterns are rationalized, and conclusions are come to by the individual through reinforcement mechanisms in the environment. These ways of viewing the world become central to our perception of events, so much so that the mind has a selective bias for information that maintains or reinforces existing schemas. In the political world, no reinforcement mechanism is more ever-present than the media. The current information economy that Canadians depend on for news and political information heavily favours the formation of these cognitive heuristics by presenting content simplified for a general audience. This familiarizes the public with common, easy-to-understand actors such as parties and party leaders through repeated exposure, building a perception of these actors that is drawn from when political opinions are formed. Consequently, while our electoral system was designed around the local candidate, the system has evolved such that in the context of an election the local candidates act primarily as representatives of the party and of the leader.

If this set of cognitive schemas was to be successfully contested by a local candidate, a prerequisite would be a willingness on the part of constituents to divert from their deeply ingrained process of information-seeking in favour of alternate means that would inform them on the local candidates, who could then attempt to display traits or communicate opinions that the convince the constituent to value the local candidate over preferred party or leader. This is difficult not only because doing so would be a significant departure from the normal means by which voters acquire information they consider relevant to their vote, but because there is also little to motivate voters to do so. Why would a voter spontaneously start voting on the basis of their local candidate when the party leaders are clearly more dominant in the political system and exponentially more information circulates about them? In a system where party discipline is so deeply ingrained into the fabric of these highly centralized political parties, there is essentially nothing an individual MP could do in parliament to effectuate serious change, essentially creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of voters not investing themselves into MPs, thereby creating MPs with little for them to invest in. To break this cycle, MPs would need some way of distinguishing themselves from their party in the eyes of their constituents in order to insulate themselves against the potential repercussions of operating in their intended capacity as political agents and thereby against the constraints of party discipline, but they are unable to do so because of those very constraints.

The notable exception is when party discipline is broken on a media salient issue, the most recent and prominent example being that of the SNC Lavalin scandal. The scandal, which dominated headlines for months and was brought up time and time again during the 2019 election, centred around justice minister Jody Wilson-Raybould, who had been politically pressured to grant a plea deal to the Quebec firm which was facing corruption charges at the time. Wilson-Raybould, as well as Jane Philpott, both resigned their high-level positions inside Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s cabinet in protest over the scandal, and were subsequently expelled from caucus. Despite both women being applauded at the time for their integrity, only Jody Wilson-Raybould would keep her seat in the subsequent election. Despite the fact that prior to the scandal Jane Philpott was widely seen as one of the most competent and capable members of cabinet, she ended up losing her seat as incumbent to a candidate of her former party, the Liberals. While Wilson-Raybould did successfully fight her way back into parliament, the odds of her doing so again remain low, as no independent candidate has ever won their seat twice in a row in Canadian history.