Nuclear Ripples: Russia's Deratification Makes Waves in CTBT's Troubled Waters

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Following decades of anti-nuclear demonstrations and multiple drafts, the United Nations produced what they thought would be the end-all-be-all of anti-proliferation legislation: the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty, introduced  in 1996, was initially created to effectively ban all nuclear testing and use of nuclear weapons, at least in countries that have ratified it. In recent news regarding the CTBT,Russia made a major announcement. On November 2nd 2023, Putin officially passed a law in Russia that  revoked their initial agreement regarding the treaty, receiving unanimous support from Moscow’s political assembly. Hence, it is unsurprising that much of the international community has expressed severe criticism and explicit disagreement with this action. 

The CTBT not only supports disarmament and non-proliferation, but also constrains the further production of more advanced weapons by countries that are already in possession of nuclear arsenals. In countries which  effectively ratified the treaty, it was successful in limiting the development of nuclear weapons. However, it is crucial to understand what exactly ratification means in the context of the CTBT. It is not simply a signature of a state representative on the treaty. To truly ratify the CTBT, a state must employ laws within their respective legislative systems, cementing their dedication to not testing. The CTBT can only be operative provided the ratification of 44 key states that are deemed “nuclear-capable”. Before Russia’s deratification, only eight states had not ratified the treaty: China, North Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States. Following Moscow’s decision, this list now comprises nine states. 

Moscow’s announcement comes at a time when Russia has been demonstrating continued aggression at the international scale. Many scholars note that Russia’s recent lashings, like the war in Ukraine, are a direct response to the West’s enlarging influence,notably when it comes to countries once a part of the Soviet Union. Despite Russia being publicly opposed to this influence for much of the past two decades, NATO and the EU have acted seemingly in disregard of this opposition, even going as far as to engage in talks of extending NATO membership to Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seemed to be the next step in communicating this opposition. However, the United States did not back away and  sent approximately 75$ billion dollars directly to support Ukraine in its war with Russia to date. As evidenced by this apparent display of support, the war was ineffective in expressing Russia’s political resolve. 

Unsurprisingly, this aggressive display of tying hands at the international level was not met with support from the international community. The European Union issued a joint statement on behalf of its members, stating that they deeply deplore Moscow’s actions. Similarly, the United States, despite not ratifying the treaty itself, published a statement saying that the action is simply a continuation of Russia’s “misguided effort to heighten nuclear risks and raise tensions as it pursues its illegal war against Ukraine.” However, Russia has made it clear that they are only deratifying to meet the current status of the United States and that it will not alter its general nuclear posture. It should be noted that these two unratified states collectively possess approximately 89% of the world’s nuclear stockpile. This stockpile, while unlikely to be used in conflict, is a passive threat to the international community and threatens the stability of the current international order. 

As the treaty has yet to be successfully put into force due to the non-ratification of some of the critical states, it is clear that there is a fundamental flaw with the treaty itself and that it is not a compelling piece of legislation. Despite its status, the CTBT has failed at accomplishing what it was created for. For instance, North Korea has continued to test and develop nuclear weapons and now possesses a politically worrisome, albeit technologically impressive, arsenal. It seems Russia’s announcement, when bringing the CTBT back into the centre of political discourse, has revealed the fundamental weaknesses of this policy. 

As many scholars argue, the era of United States hegemony may be coming to an end. The United States needs to accept that its glory days are over and ratify the treaty. This will be the first step in assuring that nuclear peace continues, as it would mean that Russia would also ratify the treaty. It seems counterintuitive for both Russia and the United States to continue to advocate against nuclear proliferation and development as states who are effectively delaying the entry into force of the treaty.

The CTBT must either be restructured to best adapt to the current international system or be abandoned entirely in favour of a more feasible policy. If restructured, the international community must first take action against those nine states that have yet to uphold ratification of the treaty. Policy action must also be taken by allied states, like France and Canada, to pressure the United States. In its statement against Russia’s deratification, the latter stated, “Canada deplores any action that endangers this norm and jeopardises the CTBT’s entry into force.” Conversely, Canada continues to reap the benefits of being one of the United States's closest allies, a state that has continued to endanger norms of peace for decades. Canada must begin to have a clear policy that aligns with its public commitments. 

Abandoning the current CTBT may mean revising what nuclear testing limits look like, with a strong emphasis on accountability. While a weak start, increasing accountability at the international level would normalise probing the motives for action and publicising inaction by member states. Inaction is demonstrated by many countries, who, despite having ratified and committed to stopping the development of nuclear arsenals, have done little to display opposition towards the United States for not ratifying. The United Nations itself distinguishes- regretfully- that while testing is a way for a state to signal possession of weapons, symbolism alone cannot explain the arsenals of these states. 

Ultimately, while policy projections may be unclear at this time, the failure of the CTBT to ensure an effective regime of nuclear non-proliferation is certain.