Does Putin fear democracy, and what does that mean for Ukraine?
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-says-western-attempt-global-dominance-will-fail-2022-03-16/
On February 24, 2022, around 200,000 Russian troops invaded Ukraine in what Putin called a “special military operation ”, triggering the largest war in Europe since the Second World War. Initially, with an attempted “blitzkrieg”, the invasion was expected to rush through Ukraine, encircle Kiev, and coerce President Zelensky to step down, replacing him with a pro-Russia “puppet leader”. This has spectacularly failed, and some think the present stalemate will push a weakened Russia to accept a peace deal favouring the US, NATO and its allies. However, would such a deal hold?
Western scholars have asserted that Putin’s nationalist vision is incompatible with a “sovereign, democratic” Ukraine, arguing that its subservience is required for Russia to retain its sphere of influence. In contrast, Russian newspapers called out Ukraine for rejecting discussions towards developing mutual security guarantees and denounced eastward NATO expansion as a threat to national security. If an effective peace-deal is to be signed, it will be necessary to avoid another ‘Treaty of Versailles’ that would further antagonise and weaken Russia, possibly leading to another, even more vile war. In another sense, it would be difficult for Ukraine to compromise on its democracy and sovereignty, for which Ukrainians have sacrificed so much. To enforce a lasting peace, the initial causes of the conflict must be addressed. Therefore, understanding conflicting Western and Russian perspectives on the conflict is essential to finding a solution that could set a durable peace, or at least to avoid a disastrous escalation. Thank you to McGill’s influential Professor T.V. Paul, who has accepted to answer some questions to bring some clarity to the situation.
“From the point of view of the West, it is the [former Soviet Republics’] democratic right to join any institution they want” T.V. Paul
Putin has repeatedly blamed the US and its NATO allies for failing to meet Russia’s security needs, which aim to block Ukraine’s accession to NATO membership. However, NATO’s website states it is a defensive alliance which promotes stability and cooperation, and that its enlargement process “poses no threat to any country”.
Putin’s alleged goal of the invasion, to stop “NATO expansion”, is called out as “fiction” by Person and McFaul, who suggest that Putin wants “something far more significant in Ukraine today”. The two American professors argue that an “angry and impatient Putin” invaded Ukraine not to stop NATO expansion, but to test out a new strategy to end Ukraine’s democracy. T.V. Paul echoes that perspective, explaining that Russian Nationalism, articulated by Putin, considers Ukraine a subjugated state, “not equal in sovereign rights”.
According to the two scholars, Putin would rather unite the two nations through coercion than allow a prosperous pro-west Ukrainian democracy. They argue that “[Putin] is threatened by a flourishing democracy in Ukraine”, “especially if the Ukrainian people also begin to prosper economically” and conclude that the leader of Russia would therefore remain committed to undermining Ukraine’s democracy and sovereignty. It’s overwhelmingly clear that Putin should fear a truly democratic Russia, as he’d probably have to step down from his position of power and face consequences for his actions. Yet in the case of Ukraine, it seems unclear if Putin fears democracy and a domino-effect, or any Western-backed regime.
“The Russians fear status humiliation” T.V. Paul
As Mearsheimer said in 2014, it’s “geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory”. Paul explains, “If you are a Great Power with your vision of a sphere of influence including your former republics, [NATO expansion] definitively threatens [your regime]”. In this view, recent Russian aggressions were always reactions to Western interference in Russia’s sphere of influence. This vision would then perceive 2014 Crimean annexation as a reaction to the alleged Western support for the 2014 Ukraine coup, and the 2022 invasion as a reaction to what Mearsheimer describes as Ukraine’s “de facto NATO membership”. Indeed, Trump started selling “defensive weapons'' to Ukraine in 2017, and NATO members even conducted major military exercises with Ukraine in the black sea in 2021. So, would any other Russian leader have reacted to protect its sphere of influence?
“[Any Russian leader] would have opposed the NATO accession by Ukraine, ” T.V. Paul
Although they would’ve opposed it, Paul explains another leader could’ve used “less conflictual or less violent options”, such as sanctions or negotiating a common-security agreement, excluding NATO, with Ukraine. So, was Putin’s attack irrational, as the West’s mainstream view would suggest?
“Sometimes things that look rational to you might look irrational to another” answers Paul, who explains that Putin’s “miscalculation was that coercion would’ve generated anti-Zelenski forces that would depose him”. Clearly, the invasion was the wrong move, as a post-invasion poll estimated the Ukrainian President’s approval rating to be over 90%. Paul adds that Putin’s track record of using military force in Georgia, Syria and Crimea with no significant Western reaction (beyond sanctions) might have led him to underestimate the West’s response to the invasion.
“The problem is Ukraine is in the middle of a great power struggle” T.V. Paul
Russia is fighting for its “Great Power” status in Ukraine, while the West cautiously protects its consolidated democratic space by bringing support to the defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Western support is characterised as “unwavering” by Biden’s national security advisor, and while shy calls for negotiation have been made, it seems improbable that Zelenski will compromise on Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Paul explains that while Western sanctions will hurt Russia’s economy “up to a point”, Ukraine will be worse off with a prolonged war. Europe is also threatened by a prolonged conflict, as the energetic situation is looking “bleak”. “Winter will illustrate how long the fight and international sympathy continues” predicts Paul, pointing out that the West could push Ukraine to the negotiating table by limiting its support. The IR expert looks at India and Turkey, who are “friendly to Russia”, as potential mediators of the conflict.
To understand on what terms the war in Ukraine could stop, some have looked at the Finnish model of neutrality, Israel’s backing by the US “without any formal alliances” or even post-WW2 Germany, whose democratic half was absorbed into NATO. In hindsight, Ukrainian NATO membership could have deterred Russia’s special operation according to Paul, but could this lead to a rigid alliance system similar to the pre-WW1 period?
The recent fatal missile explosion in Poland, a NATO member, has reminded leaders around the world of the risk of potentially atomic escalation. The conflict’s outcome cannot be yet determined but acknowledging Russian and Western existential concerns will be essential to avoid escalation and find common ground to negotiate on. For Ukraine, this might mean abandoning its NATO ambitions in the short-term while still enjoying Western diplomatic support. By doing so, the country could be able to avoid Russian aggressions without compromising its sovereignty.