Connecting The Quebec-Windsor Corridor

Train travel within Canada is riddled with unreliable, underused, and outdated infrastructure, causing Canada to struggle to keep pace with global standards. Inter-city transit is underutilized in Canada, with the average Canadian only travelling by train once every 10 years, whereas in Germany, the average resident utilizes intercity rail trips 25 times a year. 

Via Rail operates as an independent Crown Corporation, meaning that its operations are separate from those of the Canadian government, yet they are government-owned. These corporations are often used to provide services that would not be economically feasible without government contributions. Via operates to provide Canada with cross-country transport linking cities, enabling the flow of individuals. 

Within the Quebec-Windsor corridor, Via Rail provides vital services to passengers. In 2023 3,933,598 passengers travelled on Via Rail trains in the corridor, meaning that 95,54% of Via Rail ridership is in this region. Yet only 2% of all inter-city trips made between Toronto and Quebec City are made on passenger rail, with 94% of trips being made by car.

Via Rail, Canada’s sole provider of intercity rail transit, promises “safe, accessible, reliable, cost-effective, and environmentally responsible service from coast to coast to coast.” Despite promises of reliability, train delays plague Via Rail’s service. Delays have become more frequent, with 72% of trains arriving on time in 2021 and only 59% meeting that standard nationwide in 2023. 

This has come partially as a consequence of the roll-out of a new fleet of trains in the Quebec-Windsor corridor. Following the rollout of the new trains, an email stating that “delays of 30 to 60 minutes are possible on trails travelling on the … corridor.” This is due to the new Siemens trains having 24 axles compared to the CN requirement of 32, which guarantees that warning bells and barriers are activated as the train approaches. This causes the new trains to approach level crossings at a slower pace than previously. This significantly lengthens travel times as hundreds of these crossings are in the corridor. 

Additionally, train frequency cannot be increased within the corridor because, as MartinImbleau, CEO of Via HFR, stated, Via would have to “prioritize passengers over freight, which is virtually impossible on tracks that now belong to other railway companies.” Problems also arise due to passenger trains oftentimes operating at double the speed of freight trains. On the Via-owned portion of tracks, trains remained on-time 90% of the time. 

A consequence of this reliance on car travel is that Canada produces 2.3 times more transportation emissions per capita than Germany. To travel from Toronto to Montreal by plane would produce 186kgCO2e per passenger and 104kgCO2e. Compared to the 55kgCO2e produced per passenger by rail travel. 

VIA-HFR (VIA High-Frequency Rail) was established in 2022 to oversee the development of high-speed rail within Canada. Their website states that “The Toronto-Québec City Rapid Train Network is the biggest infrastructure project in Canada since the Saint Lawrence Seaway was built 70 years ago.” The inadequacy of Via Rail’s service comes from a lack of investment. In every year but one since 1995, Canada’s investment per capita in rail has been the lowest of all G7 countries. This may change if VIA-HFR’s plans are put into action.

The current plan utilized a partnership between both the private and public sectors. VIA-HFR will oversee the project,  acting “as the guardian of public interests throughout the project.” In July of 2023, the federal government shortlisted three bids for the project. These teams,  Cadence, Intercity Rail Developers, and QConnexioOn Rail Partners, were asked to submit two proposals each in October 2023. The proposals differed as one utilized conventional railway networks with trains reaching 200km/h and the other having no speed limit. These proposals were submitted in July of 2024, and the federal government is expected to select one of three bids. 

The choice to weigh the two options is based on the costs and the number of stations. Within the corridor, the political pressure from municipalities threatens to diminish the advantages that the high-speed rail provides. As more municipalities are added, the trains must slow down and stop more often. The current plans being pitched include stops in Toronto, Peterborough, Ottawa, Laval, Montreal, Trois-Rivieres, and Quebec City. 

The HS2 rail project can shed light on many valuable lessons of rising costs and long delays. HS2 is the high-speed railway being built connecting London and Birmingham, but the railway was originally designed to connect to the North. Former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak axed the Northern segment of the plan, stating that the rail project was “the ultimate example of the old consensus,” and insisted that the 36 billion pounds freed from the project would be invested into other transport projects. This example of project downsizing illustrates the risks in the changing of political leaders. Even if a bid is selected for development, the project may be shortened, altered, or shut down altogether. 

Former Finance Minister George Osborne stated that the axing of the Northern section of HS2 helps “to fuel the views of those who argue that we can no longer think or act for the long term as a country.” A short-sighted decision could endanger the benefits of large infrastructure projects such as high-speed rail in the Quebec Windsor Corridor. 

Current federal political turmoil has injected turmoil into the equation. Large infrastructure projects such as the development of high-speed rail require continued political support. Leslie Woo, the former chief planning and development officer at Metrolinx, states, “Nation-building, city-building doesn’t happen in four-year cycles. It happens for decades and centuries.” In a report on the project, an estimate of a timeline of the project was provided, describing a “minimum of 10 years and probably more like 15 years” being needed in the planning stage. 

Initially, HS2 construction costs were estimated to be 37.5 billion GBP in 2009, but in a 2019 review, the actual cost was estimated to be between 72.1 and 78.4 billion GBP. The causes for this rise in cost are plentiful, underestimations of risk and uncertainty, as well as inflation. The initial estimate suffered from an optimism bias, failing to account for the possibility of poor ground-conditions and delays in the development process. HS2 fell behind schedule due to a year-long period spent revising cost and schedule estimates, an independent review of the programme developed to determine if it was advisable to proceed, and delays to “save money”. 

A 2023 Transportation Committee report on the development of high-speed rail in the corridor revealed that $28 million has already been spent on contracts for industry experts to manage the project. The public-private development model for VIA-HFR follows in the footsteps of the HS2 structure, which serves as an example of the failures of the mixed model in the debate between publicly funded and mixed model infrastructure development. Bruno Dobson, Manager of the Urban Transport Department of the International Transport Workers' Federation, has expressed his concerns that “after 30 years of rail privatization and public-private partnership projects all over its rail system, it's now one of the most expensive rails in Europe, not just to operate but for the passengers.” Despite this, VIA-HFR remains faithful to its mixed model, expressing that HS2 has lessons that can be learned, but that the model is an ideal balanced approach. 

While the development of high-speed rail in the Quebec-Windsor Corridor is far from imminent, the foundation is being laid. HS2 is a cautionary tale of the dangers of waning political commitment and delays. The long-term value of high-speed rail needs to be valued more than short-term political gains for the project to receive continued support regardless of the party in power. Should all parties commit to high-speed rail development, the project is achievable.  Countries such as Spain developed their first high-speed rail in only 13 years starting in 1992. Technology and construction techniques have greatly improved since then, illustrating that the development of high-speed rail in Quebec-Windsor is an issue of political commitment. This political commitment is made more complex with the plethora of challenges that arise throughout the development process such as delays, rising costs, and project downsizing, meaning that high speed rail in the Quebec-Windsor corridor remains a distant vision, rather than an imminent reality.