Syria After Assad: A Fragile Future in the Wake of a Regime's Collapse
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has fundamentally reshaped Syria’s political and security landscape, leaving the country at a critical juncture. While the interim government, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its political leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has pledged a new era of governance, Syria faces deep-rooted challenges, including a fractured opposition, economic devastation, ongoing security threats, and regional power struggles. Whether Syria’s new leadership can successfully transition from an armed rebellion to a functioning government will determine if the country stabilizes or falls into deeper turmoil.
HTS, once a militant faction with ties to al-Qaeda, has sought to distance itself from its extremist past by engaging religious and ethnic minorities and pledging a transition to civilian-led governance. The group has attempted to repair relations with Christian, Druze, and Ismaili communities, including restoring confiscated properties and issuing security guarantees. However, its approach toward the Alawite population, historically tied to Assad, remains more ambiguous, fueling concerns over whether these overtures are genuine reforms or temporary gestures to consolidate power.
Economic recovery remains one of Syria’s most immediate hurdles. Following Assad’s downfall, the European Union announced a partial suspension of sanctions on Syria’s energy, transport, and financial sectors, aiming to facilitate early reconstruction efforts. However, European officials have clarified that this relief is conditional on the new government maintaining inclusivity and breaking ties with extremist elements. France, while backing the easing of sanctions, has warned that any signs of extremism or authoritarian governance could lead to their reinstatement. Despite these policy shifts, Syria’s economy remains crippled by years of war, corruption, and the destruction of critical infrastructure, with over 16.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Foreign investment remains highly unlikely without a clear economic plan, reliable financial institutions, and guarantees of political stability.
The economic devastation and political uncertainty have also stalled the prospects of large-scale refugee repatriation. While 125,000 Syrians have returned from Türkiye, Lebanon, and Jordan in the aftermath of Assad’s fall, the vast majority of Syria’s 6 million displaced population remains hesitant to return without assurances of security, legal protections, and economic stability.
In response to the regime’s collapse, Europe has begun reassessing its refugee policies. Countries such as Austria and Denmark have suspended new asylum applications for Syrians, and discussions on revoking subsidiary protection status have intensified. Under EU law, refugee protections can be rescinded if the threat in the country of origin is deemed to have ended, leaving thousands of Syrians in legal limbo. Germany, home to 47,000 pending asylum seekers, has yet to issue clear guidance, but growing domestic pressure could push for policy changes in the coming months.
While not facing the same level of asylum pressures as Europe, Canada continues to evaluate refugee claims. Immigration Minister Marc Miller has confirmed that Canada will not rush to alter its refugee policies, but officials are monitoring the evolving situation closely. Unlike European countries that may opt for forced returns, Canada’s policies remain focused on voluntary resettlement and legal pathways to permanent residency.
The fate of Syria’s refugees now depends not just on Western policies but on whether the new government can provide the necessary conditions for return. Without clear property restitution policies, economic rebuilding, and security guarantees from HTS, many Syrians will continue to choose exile over uncertainty.
Syria’s post-Assad security landscape remains deeply fractured, with multiple factions competing for control and securing foreign backing to advance their interests. The HTS-led interim government, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) each hold key strategic territories, raising the risk of renewed conflict. The Free Syrian Army and Islamic Front, once dominant, have largely fragmented or been absorbed into larger coalitions, while opposition forces in southern Syria, which previously surrendered to Assad, have risen again following his fall.
The most pressing security challenge lies in northeastern Syria, where the SDF, dominated by the Kurdish YPG, remains entrenched in resource-rich areas. The SDF governs nearly a quarter of Syria, including Raqqa and major oil fields, and has long been backed by U.S. forces in the fight against ISIS. However, Türkiye, which views the YPG as a PKK affiliate, continues pushing for its disarmament and has backed SNA forces against Kurdish-held areas. The U.S. now faces a significant decision: whether to continue supporting the SDF militarily, negotiate its role in Syria’s new political order, or scale down operations, potentially leaving the region vulnerable to Turkish intervention and renewed conflict.
Türkiye has moved quickly to secure its influence in post-Assad Syria, leveraging its existing ties with HTS to shape the country’s new power structure. Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın met with Syrian officials in Damascus, and on December 14, Türkiye reopened its embassy, signaling its willingness to engage with the new government. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has encouraged HTS to share power with opposition groups, particularly Türkiye’s proxy, the SNA, while Turkish companies prepare for economic engagement in Syria’s reconstruction.
The removal of Assad also weakens Iran’s strategic position in the region. Tehran relied on Syria as a crucial conduit for weapons transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the collapse of the regime has disrupted these supply routes. Iran’s leaders now face a difficult decision on whether to negotiate with HTS or attempt to reassert influence through proxies or covert operations. Iran’s long-term ambitions in Syria remain unclear, but its ability to project power has been significantly diminished. Meanwhile, Russia, another longtime ally of Assad, also faces a major setback. With its military overstretched in Ukraine, Moscow was unable to prevent the fall of Damascus and is now scrambling to maintain control over its naval base in Tartous and airbase in Hmeimim. Russia had invested heavily in keeping Assad in power, and his fall raises questions about Moscow’s credibility as a security guarantor. The Kremlin’s options are now limited; it can either cut a deal with HTS to maintain a presence in Syria, or it risks being completely pushed out. Losing access to its military bases would not only weaken Russia’s hold in the Middle East but also disrupt its logistical operations in Africa, where its forces depend on Syrian ports as a transit hub for military operations.
As Moscow scrambles to salvage its influence, another key regional player has wasted no time asserting its position. Israel has responded aggressively, launching airstrikes to destroy Syria’s remaining military assets and reinforcing troop deployments near the Golan Heights. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted that Syria must not become another front for Iran-backed militias, and Israeli military officials have signaled a long-term presence along the border. However, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has attempted to downplay tensions, stating that his government does not seek conflict with Israel and that the removal of Assad has eliminated Iran’s justification for military activity in Syria. Despite these reassurances, Israel’s continued airstrikes indicate that it remains skeptical of the new authorities and will likely maintain a policy of active deterrence.
While the international community debates Syria’s future, the United States (U.S) has largely taken a hands-off approach. President-elect Donald Trump has emphasized a policy of non-intervention, stating that Syria is “not America’s fight.” The administration’s primary concerns appear to be ensuring Israel’s security, containing ISIS, and maintaining regional alliances rather than actively shaping Syria’s transition. The future of U.S. troop presence in northeastern Syria remains unclear as Washington weighs whether to continue supporting the SDF or pursue a broader realignment in the region. The lack of a coherent U.S. policy leaves Syria’s post-war balance in the hands of regional actors like Türkiye, Russia, and Iran, all of whom are maneuvering to shape the country’s future in their favor.
Syria’s transition remains uncertain, with the potential for stability and renewed fragmentation. HTS faces the delicate task of proving itself as a governing force, balancing the need for legitimacy, economic recovery, and security coordination. While international actors cautiously engage, they remain wary of HTS’s long-term intentions and governance capabilities. The next few months will be decisive: if HTS integrates minority groups, strengthens institutions, and ensures economic stability, Syria may begin its slow recovery. But if sectarian divisions, governance failures, and security conflicts escalate, the country could plunge into another cycle of instability. The world is watching whether Syria’s new rulers can break from the past or if the country will remain trapped in the legacy of conflict that has defined it for over a decade.