First, Let’s Audit All the Lawyers

Canada's New Anti-Money-Laundering Rules Still Miss the Gatekeepers

When Jeffrey Epstein needed a bank, he found one. In 2013, Deutsche Bank took him on as a client, five years after his Florida conviction for procuring a minor for prostitution. New York’s Department of Financial Services fined the bank US$150 million in 2020 for compliance failures involving Epstein and two other banking relationships. Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan, which had banked Epstein before it, later agreed to pay a combined US$440 million to settle claims brought by survivors and the government of the US Virgin Islands. Those are large sums, but they tell us more about who could be held to account than about who actually knew where the money was going.

Consider the withdrawals described in New York’s consent order. Between 2013 and 2017, Epstein’s personal lawyer walked into Deutsche Bank’s Park Avenue branch and withdrew US$7,500 from Epstein’s personal accounts 97 times. When bank staff asked why Epstein needed the cash, the lawyer said it was for travel, tips and expenses. The bank filed the required currency transaction reports, but the regulator found no indication that it ever got a fuller explanation. The order is unusually instructive about what the bank could see. It knew who was withdrawing the cash and how often he came in, yet it relied on the person withdrawing it to explain what it was for. How much harder is that question when the name on the account is itself one step removed from the person whose money is moving?

In Canada, that question has acquired a price. Bill C-12, which received royal assent on March 26, 2026, raised the maximum administrative penalties that the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, or FINTRAC, can impose by up to forty times. An entity can face up to C$20 million for a very serious violation. When several violations appear on a single notice, the cumulative ceiling is the greater of C$20 million and 3% of the entity’s gross global revenue in the preceding financial year. The bill also establishes an enrollment framework for entities subject to the federal regime. Lawyers acting for clients, however, generally remain subject to anti-money-laundering oversight by provincial and territorial law societies. A higher federal penalty can give a bank more reason to ask about a transfer, even when the person in a position to answer is the lawyer.

What a bank can see

In October 2024, TD’s US banking subsidiaries pleaded guilty to criminal charges in a coordinated enforcement action that cost the bank more than US$3 billion, and one of their regulators restricted the growth of their US banking operations. TD says it spent US$507 million in fiscal 2025 alone on fixing its American anti-money-laundering controls. When I spoke with Julian Karaguesian, a visiting lecturer in economics at McGill University, he put the question of deterrence plainly. “Bigger fines would only make a difference if they’re enforced,” he said. Karaguesian was speaking about enforcement more broadly, including the role of independent courts and prosecutors. His point also bears on the federal penalties. A bank deciding how much to spend on compliance has to reckon with the likelihood that a failure will be detected as well as the amount it could cost.

When a law firm holds money for several clients in a single trust account, the bank can see the money arrive under the firm’s name, while the firm keeps the record of whose money is whose. The bank may have little way of knowing which client the transfer concerns, what legal service it relates to, or whether the transaction makes sense in light of what the lawyer knows. A trust account can make perfectly ordinary work possible, such as holding money until a sale closes. The same arrangement also lets a transfer take on the appearance of ordinary legal work before anyone outside the firm has had much chance to ask what that work is.

The difference between paying for legal work and paying for the use of a trust account is unusually clear in the case of Donald Gurney. In 2013 the West Vancouver lawyer moved C$25.8 million in offshore funds through his trust account, providing no substantial legal services in connection with the transfers and taking a tenth of one per cent. Counsel for the Law Society of British Columbia described the arrangement as renting out the account, a description the panel thought apt. In 2017, the panel suspended Gurney for six months and ordered him to give up the C$25,845 he had earned. What makes the fee revealing is that it varied with the money that passed through his hands. The account itself was what his client was paying to use.

In Ronald Pelletier’s case, the panel found that the lawyer knew the money came from a securities fraud under investigation in the United States. More than C$31 million passed through his trust account; he collected nearly C$900,000 in fees, and some of the money went towards Vancouver property, a car and a ring from Tiffany. He bought 20 burner phones because he feared investigators might be listening. He also fabricated invoices to mislead the Law Society auditors. The panel disbarred him in 2023 and observed that this appeared to be the first time a lawyer had been disciplined for money laundering. The burner phones tell us what Pelletier thought of the risk of being overheard. The invoices tell us what he thought an auditor might believe. By giving the payments the appearance of fees, he was supplying the very thing an auditor would be looking for, an explanation of what the money had to do with legal work.

What an audit should ask

Canada has good reasons to protect the confidentiality of a lawyer’s office. In 2015 the Supreme Court held that the federal regime’s search powers, as applied to lawyers, gave solicitor-client privilege inadequate protection. The majority also found that the scheme interfered with lawyers’ duty of commitment to their clients. The Court expressly left open whether the profession’s self-regulation was constitutionally required. Law societies already have rules of their own. Lawyers generally cannot accept more than C$7,500 in cash on a single matter. For covered financial transactions, they must verify who the client is and record information about where the money came from. A trust account is for funds connected to legal services, and law societies can inspect firms’ records. In British Columbia, the usual cycle is six years, with audits at least every four years for firms in higher-risk areas.

The case for relying on law societies is that their auditors can inspect the files that explain why the money moved, and they can discipline the lawyer if that explanation falls apart. Banks still have their own reporting duties when money passes through a trust account. But the bank and the law society see different things at different times. The bank can flag a payment as it happens with only the information visible to it. A law society auditor can look at the client file and ask what the payment was for, sometimes years after the money has gone. The lawyer is the one with the best chance to ask while there is still time to refuse the transfer.

Finance Canada’s 2025 assessment identifies trust accounts, real estate transactions and the creation or management of companies and trusts as especially vulnerable to misuse. The Financial Action Task Force and the Asia/Pacific Group’s 2026 evaluation acknowledges the risk-based work some law societies already do and finds that audits specifically aimed at money-laundering obligations are limited. In 2016, international evaluators had already identified the exclusion of lawyers from the federal regime as a serious obstacle. A decade on, the question is how much of that gap the law societies can close in practice. Karaguesian pointed to digital assets as another place money can go when one route becomes harder to use. In his words, “you’re only closing one hole.” 

Law societies should build on the audits they already conduct by selecting more files from the areas Finance Canada identifies as vulnerable. For a high-risk transfer, the useful question is what the lawyer could establish before the money moved. Firms already have to record information about the source of funds for covered transactions. A more demanding review would ask what evidence supported that account, what legal work the transfer served and how the lawyer resolved any inconsistencies. The firm would keep that record for law society review, with safeguards for solicitor-client privilege. In a case like Gurney’s, the auditor could ask what, apart from the lawyer’s involvement in moving the funds, made it necessary to use a trust account at all.

Canada’s public federal registry can show who controls a corporation incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act, including people who control it through a trust. A trust does not have its own entry there, and the federal register does not cover provincially incorporated companies. Some trusts already disclose beneficial ownership information to the Canada Revenue Agency. Federal and provincial governments should build on existing disclosures so that investigators can obtain verified information about the people who ultimately own or control those structures across jurisdictions. The point is to make it possible to follow a transfer from the account on which it appears to the person on whose behalf it was made.

The Deutsche Bank order is worth reading because it records an answer the bank accepted. Travel, tips and expenses may explain a withdrawal. Once the same explanation has to account for years of withdrawals, it is worth asking what evidence supports it. Canada has increased what it can charge a bank for failing to ask such questions. A law society audit can ask what the person who handled the money knew at the time, and what they did with that knowledge. Dick the Butcher wanted to kill all the lawyers. I’d start with the books.

Edited by Jai Shah

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